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CALCULATING CREDIBILITY: STATE V. SHARMA AND 
THE FUTURE OF POLYGRAPH ADMISSIBILITY IN OHIO 
AND BEYOND 
Vincent V. Vigluicci∗ 
“Guilt carries Fear always about with it; there is a Tremor in the 
Blood of a Thief, that, if attended to, would effectually discover him . . . 
It is true some are so hardened in Crime that they will boldly hold their 
Faces to it, carry it off with an Air of Contempt, and outface even a 
Pursuer; but take hold of his Wrist and feel his Pulse, there you will find 
his Guilt; . . . a fluttering Heart, an unequal Pulse, a sudden Palpitation 
shall eventually confess he is the Man, in spite of a bold Countenance or 
a false Tongue.” 
      
- Daniel Defoe, 1730 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Almost a century after its inception, the polygraph test remains one 
of the most fascinating forms of evidence.1  Firmly entrenched in 
popular mythology, the polygraph offers the promise of calculating truth 
and credibility with scientific certainty, a proposition that continues to 
capture the public’s imagination.2  At the same time, the polygraph has 
also been viewed with great trepidation as a flawed and dangerous 
instrument of oppression.3  Commonly called a “lie detector,” the 
polygraph does not actually detect lying; it measures subtle changes in 
blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and the skin’s resistance to electricity 
that are thought to result from the effort to deceive.4  These physical 
reactions constitute the automatic “fight or flight” response produced by 
the human body when it is faced with a situation of threat or stress.5   
In Ohio courts and in courts across America, polygraph evidence 
has been perhaps the most controversial of all scientific evidence.  In 
fact, critics assert that polygraph tests are not “scientific” at all.6  Radar, 
ballistics, breath intoxication devices, and even psychiatric testimony 
have been far more willingly accepted in our legal system.7  Whether the 
polygraph is adequately “reliable” or “scientific” to merit expert 
testimony in court has been a heated national debate for decades and one 
that remains largely unresolved today.8   
 
 1.  See STANLEY ABRAMS, A POLYGRAPH HANDBOOK FOR ATTORNEYS at xi-xii (1977). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  See GEORGE W. MASCHKE & GINO J. SCALABRINI, THE LIE BEHIND THE LIE DETECTOR 
16-17 (4th digital ed. 2005), available at http://www.antipolygraph.org/lie-behind-the-lie-
detector.pdf. 
 4.  ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 5-6.   
 5.  Id.  The theory that physiological changes measured by the polygraph result from the 
effort to deceive remains controversial, lying at the heart of the debate over the polygraph’s validity.  
See infra notes 149-154.  
 6.  See, e.g., MASCHKE & SCALABRINI, supra note 3, at 18-21 (arguing that “[p]olygraphy is 
not science . . . . [I]t is codified conjecture masquerading as science”). 
 7.  ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 121. 
 8.  See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309-11 (1998) (stating that “[t]o this day, the 
scientific community remains extremely polarized about the reliability of polygraph techniques . . . . 
This lack of scientific consensus is reflected in the disagreement among state and federal courts 
concerning both the admissibility and the reliability of polygraph evidence.”); see generally 
American Polygraph Association, http://www.polygraph.org (last visited October 9, 2008); 
2
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This Note considers the current state of polygraph admissibility law 
in Ohio and nationwide, and examines the recent Ohio case of State v. 
Sharma,9 where one judge contradicted state precedent by admitting into 
evidence the results of a defendant’s three passed polygraphs without the 
prosecutor’s stipulation.10  Major arguments for and against expanded 
polygraph admissibility will be examined.  This Note ultimately argues 
that stipulation should remain the fundamental guideline for Ohio 
judges, but argues that judges should have the discretion to admit 
reliable polygraphs without stipulation in exceptional cases.  However, 
in those cases, the opposing party should always have the opportunity to 
rebut that evidence by retesting the person and presenting its own 
reliable polygraph evidence.  Because polygraph evidence differs 
significantly from other forms of scientific evidence,11 this Note 
suggests that a separate rule of evidence dealing specifically with 
polygraphs may be useful.  In approaching Ohio’s current system of 
polygraph admissibility with an eye to improvement, it is important to 
understand Ohio’s current polygraph admissibility law and the evolution 
of polygraph policy both state and nationwide. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The History and Evolution of Polygraph Admissibility Nationwide  
 1. Early Polygraphs and the Frye Test 
 Dr. William Marston is credited as the inventor of modern lie 
detection.12  In 1915, he found systolic blood pressure changes to be 
associated with deception and developed a systolic blood pressure 
deception test.13  An avid publicist, Dr. Marston either coined the phrase 
“lie detector” himself or adopted it from a reporter to whom he described 
the wonders of his device.14  However, the courts approached Dr. 
 
AntiPolygraph.org, http://www.antipolygraph.org (last visited October 9, 2008) (representing 
opposite sides of the argument). 
 9.  875 N.E.2d 1002 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2007). 
 10.  Id. at 1010. 
 11.  See, e.g., infra note 168 and accompanying text.   
 12.  DAVID T. LYKKEN, A TREMOR IN THE BLOOD: USES AND ABUSES OF THE LIE DETECTOR 
27 (1981).  
 13.  Gordon H. Barland, The Polygraph Test in the USA and Elsewhere, in THE POLYGRAPH 
TEST: LIES, TRUTH AND SCIENCE 75 (Anthony Gale ed., 1988). 
 14.  LYKKEN, supra note 12, at 27. 
3
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Marston’s new device with caution and apprehension.15  In Frye v. 
United States,16 the Federal Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia denied admission of Dr. Marston’s polygraph results that 
indicated the defendant, Frye, was innocent of murder.17  The court’s 
rationale was that Dr. Marston’s test had “not yet gained such standing 
and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological 
authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony 
deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far 
made.”18   
 More importantly, the Frye court set out its famous “general 
acceptance” test for determining the admissibility of novel scientific 
evidence, which would almost exclusively govern the admission of such 
evidence for the next seventy years.19  The court articulated its “general 
acceptance” test as follows:  
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between 
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.  
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle 
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting 
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle 
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be 
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs.20  
Dr. Marston and his test results were vindicated when Frye was 
later exonerated and released.21  However, despite Frye’s innocence and 
improvements in polygraph technology over the years, the Frye test 
proved a strong barrier to polygraph admissibility over the next several 
decades and remains so today.22 
 
 15.  See id. at 218.  
 16.  293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 17.  Id. at 1014.  Frye had confessed to second-degree murder, but later recanted his 
confession and claimed it was the result of coercion.  LYKKEN, supra note 12, at 218.  To support 
this claim, Frye sought to introduce the testimony of Dr. Marston, who had administered his 
deception test to Frye and concluded that Frye was telling the truth about the coerced confession.  
Id.   
 18.  Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
 19.  The Frye test governed the admission of expert testimony until the landmark case of 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), which dramatically altered the 
standard for admitting scientific evidence.  See infra Part II(A)(2). 
 20.  Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
 21.  LYKKEN, supra note 12, at 218. 
 22.  See Jay P. Kesan, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 84 GEO. 
L.J. 1985, 1990 n.26 (1996) (noting that when the Supreme Court finally overruled Frye with 
Daubert in 1993, ten out of thirteen federal circuits adhered to Frye, while the three other circuits 
4
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2. Daubert Changes the Landscape   
The U.S. Supreme Court finally rejected Frye’s general acceptance 
test in the landmark 1993 case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals.23  The Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
particularly Rule 702, superseded the Frye test, and the Court went on to 
outline the appropriate modern analysis for the admissibility of scientific 
evidence.24  The Court held that that there is no “definitive checklist” or 
“test” that a trial judge should use in deciding the admissibility of 
scientific evidence.25  However, the Court did suggest a non-exhaustive 
list of factors that a trial court should consider, including:  
(1) Whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested; 
 
 (2) Whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer 
review and publication; 
 
(3) The theory or technique’s known or potential rate of error; and 
 
(4) Whether the theory or technique has been generally accepted 
within the relevant scientific community.26   
 
The trial judge has a much larger role in deciding the admissibility 
of scientific evidence under Daubert regime than was the case under 
Frye.27  Under Frye, the judge’s only job was to decide if enough experts 
in the relevant scientific community thought the technique was reliable, 
while under Daubert the judge herself must make the reliability 
determination, perhaps despite the technique’s lack of general 
acceptance.28  The Supreme Court of Ohio has yet to address the 
reliability and admissibility of polygraphs under the Daubert standard 
and revised Ohio Rule of Evidence 702.29  
 
had previously held Frye did not survive the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975); 
see also State v. Valdez, 371 P.2d 894, 896-900 (Ariz. 1962) (tracing the evolution (or lack thereof) 
of polygraph admissibility law in the decades following Frye). 
 23.  509 U.S. 579, 586-87 (1993). 
 24.  Id. at 587-95. 
 25.  Id. at 593. 
 26.  Id. at 593-94. 
 27.  Lloyd C. Peeples, III, Stephen P. Bell, Jr. & T. Michael Guiffre, Exculpatory Polygraphs 
in the Courtroom: How the Truth May Not Set You Free, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 77, 85 (1997-98). 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Ohio Rule of Evidence 702 currently reads as follows: 
Evid.R. 702. Testimony by Experts 
A witness may testify as an expert if all of the following apply: 
5
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3. Per Se Inadmissibility Remains the Majority Approach among 
the States 
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court overturning Frye’s “general 
acceptance” test in favor of a much broader standard for admitting 
scientific evidence, the majority approach to polygraphs among the 
states remains per se inadmissibility, that is, a total ban on all polygraph 
evidence.30  Because it has been the most popular approach over the last 
century, the per se inadmissible rule has been termed the “traditional 
approach” to polygraph admissibility.31  As their basis for exclusion, 
state courts have argued mainly that polygraph evidence is unreliable 
and not generally accepted in the scientific community, that admitting 
polygraphs would lead to time-consuming, confusing, and tangential 
debates, and that polygraphs tend to prejudice juries.32    
The traditional rule of per se inadmissibility has received a great 
deal of scholarly criticism in the states where it remains.33  Critics of the 
 
(A) The witness’ testimony either relates to matters beyond the 
knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a 
misconception common among lay persons; 
(B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the 
subject matter of the testimony; 
(C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, 
technical, or other specialized information.  To the extent that the 
testimony reports the result of a procedure, test, or experiment, the 
testimony is reliable only if all of the following apply: 
(1) The theory upon which the procedure, test, or 
experiment is based is objectively verifiable or is 
validly derived from widely accepted knowledge, facts, 
or principles; 
(2) The design of the procedure, test, or experiment 
reliably implements the theory; 
(3) The particular procedure, test, or experiment was 
conducted in a way that will yield an accurate result. 
 30.  Peeples, Bell & Guiffre, supra note 27, at 96 n.135; see also State v. Domicz, 907 A.2d 
395, 411 (N.J. 2006) (summarizing polygraph admissibility law among the states). 
 31.  See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that “the 
traditional approach holds polygraph evidence inadmissible when offered by either party, either as 
substantive evidence or as relating to the credibility of a witness.”); see also Mark W. Brennan, 
Note, Reexamining Polygraph Admissibility: United States v. Piccinonna Underwood v. Colonial 
Penn Insurance Co., 56 MO. L. REV. 143, 149 (1991).  
 32.  See James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reevaluation – Polygraph Admissibility after 
Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 369 (1996).  
 33.  See, e.g., Doran D. Peters, Comment, Per Se Prohibitions of the Admission of Polygraph 
Evidence as Upheld in Scheffer are Both Violative of the Constitution and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence as Applied by Daubert, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 249, 272-78 (2000);  Kevin Muenster, Notes 
and Comments, The Re-Lie-Ability of Polygraph Evidence: An Evaluation of Whether Texas’s Per 
6
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traditional rule argue that it runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
Daubert standard, the Federal Rules of Evidence, the states’ Rules of 
Evidence, and a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a 
defense.34  Nevertheless, in 1998’s United States v. Scheffer,35 the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a military rule of evidence 
banning all polygraph evidence in courts-martial.36  The Court held that 
Military Rule of Evidence 70737 did not unconstitutionally abridge the 
right to present a defense.38  The Court reasoned that a criminal 
defendant’s right to present a defense may be subject to reasonable 
restrictions in order to uphold other legitimate and countervailing 
interests in the criminal trial process.39    
 
Se Rule Against the Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence is Violative of the Texas Rules of Evidence, 
58 BAYLOR L. REV. 265, 279-84, 288 (2006). 
 34.  See Peters, supra note 33, at 277 (stating that “[n]ot only are per se rules prohibiting 
polygraph evidence from admission into trial proceedings violative of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
and Daubert, but also of the United States Constitution.  By denying a trial judge the ability to 
determine whether or not certain evidence should be admitted, these per se rules are denying the 
judge his role as ‘gatekeeper.’  This role was envisioned by both the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
Daubert.”); see also Muenster, supra note 33, at 288 (noting that “[t]he abandonment of Texas's per 
se rule against the admissibility of polygraph evidence is necessary to bring Texas jurisprudence in 
accordance with the procedural requirements of the Texas Rules of Evidence.”).  
 35.  523 U.S. 303 (1998).   
 36.  Id. at 303-04, 317.  A polygraph test of Airman Scheffer indicated, in the opinion of the 
Air Force examiner administering the test, that there was “no deception” in his denial that he had 
used drugs since enlisting.  Id. at 303.  Urinalysis, however, revealed the presence of 
methamphetamine, and Scheffer was tried by general court-martial for using that drug and for other 
offenses.  Id.  The military judge relied on Military Rule of Evidence 707 in denying Scheffer’s 
motion to admit the polygraph evidence.  Id.  Scheffer was convicted on all counts, and the Air 
Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.  Id.  The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
reversed, holding that a per se exclusion of polygraph evidence offered by an accused to support his 
credibility violates his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.  Id.  The Supreme Court 
reversed, upholding as constitutional the per se ban on polygraph evidence in military courts.  Id.   
 37.  Military Rule of Evidence 707 provides, in relevant part: “(a) Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph 
examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph 
examination, shall not be admitted into evidence.” UNITED STATES MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, at III-39 (2008). 
 38.  United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 317 (1998). 
 39.  Id. at 303.  The Court explained: “Rule 707 serves several legitimate interests in the 
criminal trial process.  These interests include ensuring that only reliable evidence is introduced at 
trial, preserving the court members’ role in determining credibility, and avoiding litigation that is 
collateral to the primary purpose of the trial.”  Id. at 309.  The Court held that “[t]he Rule is neither 
arbitrary nor disproportionate in promoting these ends.  Nor does it implicate a sufficiently weighty 
interest of the defendant to raise a constitutional concern under our precedents.”  Id.  
7
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4. New Mexico’s Unique System of General Polygraph 
Admissibility 
New Mexico employs a one-of-a-kind system of polygraph 
admissibility that has attracted significant attention since its inception.40  
With its 1975 decision in State v. Dorsey,41 the Supreme Court of New 
Mexico made New Mexico the only state that allows polygraph evidence 
to be admitted without both parties’ stipulation.42  The Dorsey court 
flatly rejected two of New Mexico’s previous requirements for 
polygraph admissibility, the stipulation requirement and the requirement 
that there be no objection offered at trial.43  The court called these two 
requirements “(1) [m]echanistic in nature; (2) [i]nconsistent with the 
concept of due process; (3) [r]epugnant to the announced purpose and 
construction of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence44 . . . ; and (4) 
[p]articularly incompatible with the purposes and scope of Rules 401, 
402, 702, and 703 of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence.”45  The 
general requirements for polygraph admissibility in New Mexico that 
remained were: (1) a qualified polygraph operator, (2) reliable testing 
procedures, and (3) valid tests.46   
In 1983, the Supreme Court of New Mexico enacted New Mexico 
Rule of Evidence 11-707, a rule completely separate from the state’s 
expert testimony rule that established a detailed and comprehensive 
system for admitting polygraph evidence.47  Rule 11-707 permits 
admission of polygraph evidence to prove the truthfulness of any 
witness, provided that the evidence meets certain reliability 
requirements.48  Because this rule applies only to polygraphs of 
 
 40.  See, e.g., 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD L. IMWINKELREID, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 
8.02(d), at 421 (4th ed. 2007). 
 41.  539 P.2d 204 (N.M. 1975).   
 42.  Peeples, Bell & Guiffre, supra note 27, at 100.   
 43.  Dorsey, 539 P.2d at 204-05.   
 44.  The “purpose and construction” of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence reads as follows: 
“These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration . . . and promotion of growth and 
development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings 
justly determined.”  Id. at 205. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  N.M. R. EVID. 11-707; Peeples, Bell & Guiffre, supra note 27, at 100. 
 48.  Peeples, Bell & Guiffre, supra note 27, at 100.  New Mexico Rule of Evidence 11-707 
reads:  
Rule 11-707.  Polygraph Examinations 
A. Definitions.  As used in this rule: 
8
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witnesses, a criminal defendant who wishes to admit his own 
exculpatory polygraph must take the stand in his own defense, thus 
exposing himself to cross-examination.49  Because it includes no 
 
(1) “chart” means the record of bodily reactions by a polygraph 
instrument that is attached to the human body during a series of 
questions; 
(2) “polygraph examination” means a test using a polygraph instrument 
which at a minimum simultaneously graphically records on a chart the 
physiological changes in human respiration, cardiovascular activity, 
galvanic skin resistance or reflex for the purpose of lie detection; 
(3) “polygraph examiner” means any person who is qualified to 
administer or interpret a polygraph examination; and 
(4) “relevant question” means a clear and concise question which refers 
to specific objective facts directly related to the purpose of the 
examination and does not allow rationalization in the answer. 
B. Minimum Qualifications of Polygraph Examiner.  To be qualified as an 
expert witness on the truthfulness of a witness, a polygraph examiner must 
have at least the following minimum qualifications: 
(1) at least five (5) years’ experience in administration or interpretation 
of polygraph examinations or equivalent academic training; 
(2) conducted or reviewed the examination in accordance with the 
provisions of this rule; and 
(3) successfully completed at least twenty (20) hours of continuing 
education in the field of polygraph examinations during the twelve (12) 
month period immediately prior to the date of the examination. 
C. Admissibility of Results.  Subject to the provisions of these rules, the 
opinion of a polygraph examiner may in the discretion of the trial judge be 
admitted as evidence as to the truthfulness of any person called as a witness if 
the examination was performed by a person who is qualified as an expert 
polygraph examiner pursuant to the provisions of this rule and if: 
(1) the polygraph examination was conducted in accordance with the 
provisions of this rule; 
(2) the polygraph examination was quantitatively scored in a manner 
that is generally accepted as reliable by polygraph experts; 
(3) prior to conducting the polygraph examination the polygraph 
examiner was informed as to the examinee’s background, health, 
education and other relevant information; 
(4) at least two (2) relevant questions were asked during the 
examination; and 
(5) at least three (3) charts were taken of the examinee . . . .  
E. Recording of Tests.  The pretest interview and actual testing shall be 
recorded in full on an audio or video recording device . . . .  
G. Compelled polygraph examinations.  No witness shall be compelled to 
take a polygraph examination over objection.  However, for good cause 
shown, the court may compel the taking of a polygraph examination by a 
witness who has previously voluntarily taken an examination and has given 
notice pursuant to Paragraph D that the party intends to use the polygraph 
examination.  If a witness refuses to take a polygraph examination ordered by 
the court under this paragraph, opinions of other polygraph examiners as to 
the truthfulness of the witness shall be inadmissible as evidence.  
 49.  See N.M. R. EVID. 11-707(B), (C), (G). 
9
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stipulation requirement, New Mexico’s novel approach to polygraph 
evidence remains America’s most liberal.50  
At the same time, New Mexico’s approach includes substantial 
reliability standards for both the polygraph test and examiner.51  The 
polygraph examiner must have had at least five years of experience in 
giving and interpreting polygraphs at the time of the test, along with at 
least twenty hours of continuing polygraph education in the year before 
the test.52  The test itself must be scored in a generally accepted manner, 
the examiner must have been briefed on the subject’s background before 
the test, and the test must include at least two relevant questions and 
produce three charts.53  The pretest interview and the test itself must both 
be audio or video recorded.54  Even if these requirements are met, New 
Mexico judges may, in their discretion, refuse to admit any polygraph 
evidence.55 
B. Stipulation: The Law of Polygraph Admissibility in Ohio and About 
20 Other States  
1. The Stipulation Approach: Valdez and Souel 
In 1962, the tide began to turn in favor of polygraph admissibility 
with the Arizona case of State v. Valdez.56  In Valdez, the Arizona 
 
 50.  See Peeples, Bell & Guiffre, supra note 27, at 101. 
 51.  See N.M. R. EVID. 11-707(B), (C), (E). 
 52.  N.M. R. EVID. 11-707(B)(1), (3). 
 53.  N.M. R. EVID. 11-707(C)(2), (3), (4), (5). 
 54.  N.M. R. EVID. 11-707(E).  This requirement is a particularly good one.  Recording the 
test allows the judge to view or hear the test to aid in his decision to admit it.  Recording the test 
also potentially allows a jury to view or hear the test in open court so it may observe how the test 
was conducted and better interpret its results.         
 55.  N.M. R. EVID. 11-707(C). 
 56.  371 P.2d 894 (Ariz. 1962).  Valdez was tried for and convicted of possession of narcotics.  
Id. at 895.  Pursuant to a written stipulation agreement entered into by Valdez, his counsel, and the 
prosecutor before trial, Valdez took a polygraph test.  Id.  The stipulation agreement provided that 
the results of the polygraph would be admissible at trial.  Id.  The polygraph operator was then 
permitted, over Valdez’s objection, to testify at trial as to the results of the polygraph (which were 
unfavorable to Valdez).  Id.  After the guilty verdict and before sentencing, the trial court certified a 
question to the Arizona Supreme Court asking if this stipulation procedure was permissible.  Id.  
The Court held:  
[S]ubject to the qualifications announced herein, we hold that polygraphs and 
expert testimony relating thereto are admissible upon stipulation in Arizona 
criminal cases.  And in such cases the lie-detector evidence is admissible to 
corroborate other evidence of a defendant's participation in the crime charged.  
If he takes the stand such evidence is admissible to corroborate or impeach 
his own testimony.  
10
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Supreme Court held that the polygraph had finally achieved the state of 
acceptability necessary to be admissible as scientific evidence.57  
However, the court further held that for polygraphs to be admissible, 
four requirements first had to be met.58  The most important requirement 
was that both parties stipulate in writing to the admissibility of 
polygraph results prior to any tests.59   
Ohio did not begin to reassess its policy barring polygraph evidence 
until the mid-1970s.60  In 1978, the Ohio Supreme Court decided the 
state’s seminal polygraph case, State v. Souel,61 where it adopted the 
Valdez system of stipulated polygraph admissibility.62  
In Souel, the Court held that polygraphs should be admissible into 
evidence at trial for purposes of corroboration or impeachment, provided 
that the Valdez qualifications were met.63  The Court justified its new 
standard with the following explanation: 
 
Id. at 900.    
 57.  Valdez, 371 P.2d at 900 (stating that “[a]lthough much remains to be done to perfect the 
lie-detector as a means of determining credibility, we think it has been developed to a state in which 
its results are probative enough to warrant admissibility upon stipulation.”).  
 58.  Id. at 900-01.  These four requirements, called “qualifications” by the Valdez court, are 
set out infra at note 63, as the Ohio Supreme Court adopted them sixteen years later. 
 59.  Id. at 900. 
 60.  See State v. Towns, 301 N.E.2d 700, 705-07 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973) (upholding the 
admission of a polygraph exam where an accused murderer failed the test but had stipulated with 
the prosecution to admissibility before the test was conducted); State v. Sims, 369 N.E.2d 24, 26, 
44-47 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1977) (sharing Towns’ view that once the defendant and prosecution agree 
to the admissibility of a polygraph expert, neither can bar the testimony based on the results).   
 61.  372 N.E.2d 1318 (Ohio 1978). 
 62.  Id. at 1323. 
 63.  The Souel Court adopted the four Valdez requirements almost verbatim.  These 
requirements are set out in Souel’s syllabus as follows: 
(1) The prosecuting attorney, defendant and his counsel must sign a written 
stipulation providing for defendant’s submission to the test and for the 
subsequent admission at trial of the graphs and the examiner’s opinion 
thereon on behalf of either defendant or the state. 
 
(2)  Notwithstanding the stipulation, the admissibility of the test results is 
subject to the discretion of the trial judge, and if the trial judge is not 
convinced that the examiner is qualified or that the test was conducted under 
proper conditions he may refuse to accept such evidence.   
 
(3) If the graphs and examiner’s opinion are offered in evidence the opposing 
party shall have the right to cross-examine the examiner respecting: 
(a) the examiner’s qualifications and training; 
(b) the conditions under which the test was administered; 
(c) the limitations of and possibilities for error in the technique of  
polygraphic interrogation; and,  
11
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We adopt the Valdez qualifications because these requisites respond to 
the major objections to the admission of polygraph evidence.  The 
requirement of mutual agreement to a written stipulation, and the 
supervisory power of the trial judge, will insure control over what is 
generally recognized as the single most important variable affecting 
the accuracy of the polygraph test results, viz. the polygraph examiner 
. . . . In addition, the opportunity for cross-examination of the operator 
by opposing counsel and the delivery of a limiting instruction by the 
trial court will help to prevent encroachment upon the jury function by 
undue reliance on this expert testimony.64 
The Souel Court also expressed its agreement with a statement of 
the Supreme Court of Wyoming from the previous year: “We see no 
reason why the polygraph expert should be treated in any more 
restrictive manner than other experts.”65 
The strongest barrier to polygraph admissibility among Souel’s 
safeguards remains the stipulation requirement.  The stipulation 
requirement was intended to be a practical solution to the difficulty a 
trial judge faced in assuring a competent polygrapher along with a 
scientifically reliable examination.66  There were and remain today 
various questioning techniques, devices, and scoring methods used in 
 
(d) at the discretion of the trial judge, any other matter deemed 
pertinent to the inquiry. 
 
(4) If such evidence is admitted the trial judge should instruct the jury to the 
effect that the examiner’s testimony does not tend to prove or disprove any 
element of the crime with which a defendant is charged, and that it is for the 
jurors to determine what weight and effect such testimony should be given. 
 
Id. at 1318-19. 
 64.  Id. at 1323 (citation omitted).  
 65.  Id. at 1324 (quoting Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445, 458 (Wyo. 1977)).  The rest of the 
Cullin court’s statement quoted approvingly by the Ohio Supreme Court in Souel read as follows: 
That the polygraph deals with mind and body reactions should not subject it 
to exclusion from consideration any more than other testimony of a scientific 
nature.  We have long utilized the expertise of psychiatrists and psychologists 
to furnish advice and assistance to the jury to explore the mysteries of the 
mind with respect to mental illness as a defense.  Medical doctors are 
regularly called upon to testify as to intricate workings of the body in 
sensitive questions of a complex physical condition or cause of death.  It is 
the normal obligation of the trial judge to protect the jurors from exposure to 
evidence which might mislead them, regardless of whatever kind of scientific 
evidence is under scrutiny.  The device of cross-examination soon smokes out 
the inept, the unlearned, the inadequate self-styled expert. 
Id. (quoting Cullin, 565 P.2d at 458). 
 66.  Michael D. Morgan, Lying in the Heartland: Problems and Solutions Regarding 
Polygraph Evidence in Ohio Criminal Procedure, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 89, 94 (2000).   
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polygraph examinations.67  The distinctions between these techniques 
were, and to an extent remain, technical and unresolved among 
polygraphers.68  A major problem with the Frye test was that it forced 
judges to make complex distinctions between different polygraph 
techniques and figure out which, if any, was generally accepted as 
reliable in the field of polygraphy.69  This prompted jurisdictions 
wishing to move toward limited polygraph admissibility to do so via 
stipulation agreements, which served to eliminate time consuming and 
tangential debates about the general acceptance of a particular method of 
polygraphy.70  Besides Ohio, about twenty other states have stipulation 
requirements to admit polygraph results.71 
2. Davis Creates Some Confusion 
In 1991’s State v. Davis,72 the Ohio Supreme Court declined to 
expand Souel to require prosecutors, through discovery, to produce the 
results of polygraph examinations administered to state witnesses under 
Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(B)(1)(d).73  While upholding 
Souel’s rule of stipulated polygraph admission, the Davis Court stated:  
 
 67.  Id. at 93.  See also id. at 104-12 (describing and explaining different polygraph 
techniques and methods of scoring and interpretation).  A detailed analysis of the different methods 
of polygraphy is beyond the scope of this Note.  
 68.  Id. at 93. 
 69.  Id.  The larger problem with Frye’s general acceptance test was that it failed to get to the 
heart of the matter: reliability.  Just because a scientific test is new and not yet generally accepted in 
the scientific community does not necessarily mean that the test is not reliable.  Novel scientific 
tests can take decades to become generally accepted.  Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 
reliability, not general acceptance, is the main concern in dealing with scientific expert testimony.  
Daubert recognized this, pointing out that general acceptance should be only one of many factors 
considered in determining a test’s reliability.  See supra Part II(A)(2). 
 70.  Morgan, supra note 66, at 93. 
 71.  Other states with a stipulation rule include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, 
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.  See Peeples, Bell & Guiffre, supra note 27, at 97 n.140.  See 
also State v. Domicz, 907 A.2d 395, 411 (N.J. 2006) (summarizing polygraph admissibility law 
among the states). 
 72.  581 N.E.2d 1362 (Ohio 1991). 
 73.  Id. at 1376.  Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(B)(1)(d) reads, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
(B) Disclosure of evidence by the prosecuting attorney 
(1) Information subject to disclosure . . . .  
(d) Reports of examination and tests.  Upon motion of the 
defendant the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to permit 
the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any results or 
reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests 
or experiments, made in connection with the particular case, or 
13
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The nature of polygraphs is different from traditional scientific tests.  
Most, if not all, scientific tests involve objective measurements, such 
as blood or genetic typing or gunshot residue.  In a polygraph test, the 
bodily response of the examinee to his answers is dependant upon the 
subjective interpretation thereof by the examiner.  Inasmuch as the test 
is not perceived by the profession to be reasonably reliable, its 
admissibility is limited to situations where the parties stipulate to its 
admission.74 
This view of polygraphs as unreliable or outright unscientific is 
inconsistent with the more favorable view of polygraphs expressed by 
the Ohio Supreme Court in Souel.75  Because Davis involved the narrow 
issue of polygraph discoverability, the court’s view of the unreliability 
of polygraphs and its interpretation of Souel’s purpose appear to be mere 
dicta.76   
If the Davis court intended to limit Souel in any way,77 the 
continued reliance on Souel by Ohio’s lower courts signifies that this has 
 
copies thereof, available to or within the possession, custody or 
control of the state, the existence of which is known or by the 
exercise of due diligence may become known to the prosecuting 
attorney. 
With its holding, the Davis Court expressed its view that polygraph tests do not qualify as 
“physical or mental examinations” or “scientific tests.”  Davis, 581 N.E.2d at 1376.   
 74.  Id. 
 75.  In Souel, the Ohio Supreme Court did not mention polygraphs being unscientific or 
unreliable as a reason for adopting the stipulation requirement.  What the Souel court said was the 
following:  
Despite the ongoing controversy concerning the degree of accuracy of the 
polygraph device, it is our opinion that observance of the Valdez 
qualifications establishes a proper foundation for the admission of polygraph 
test results, and that these results have probative value in the determination of 
whether the examinee has been deceptive during interrogation.  
State v. Souel, 372 N.E.2d 1318, 1323-24 (Ohio 1978).    
 76.  See Morgan, supra note 66, at 102-04.  
 77.  See Davis, 581 N.E.2d at 1376 (stating “Souel held that, regardless of the admission of 
the polygraph test results, that particular case contained sufficient evidence to justify the 
conviction.”).  It is hard to say what the Davis Court’s intentions really were, but it is worth noting 
that the polygraph issue took up a very small portion of a very lengthy opinion involving many 
other issues and twenty-four assignments of error.  The author suggests that the Davis Court did not 
intend to bring about any sort of sea change in Ohio polygraph admissibility law, but was simply 
attempting to resolve a narrow discovery issue.  In its very brief discussion of Souel and the purpose 
of Souel’s stipulation requirement, the Davis Court seems to have completely misinterpreted Souel.  
In introducing the Valdez stipulation rule, the Souel Court was providing a way to admit polygraph 
evidence where none had previously existed.  See supra Part II(B)(1).  The Souel Court did this 
because of its belief in the polygraph’s increasing reliability, not because it thought polygraph 
evidence was inherently unreliable. 
14
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not been acknowledged or understood.78  Souel remains controlling law 
and stipulated admissibility remains Ohio’s approach to polygraph 
evidence.79  As noted above, with both Souel and Davis predating 
Daubert, the Ohio Supreme Court has yet to address the reliability and 
admissibility of polygraph results under the Daubert standard and Ohio 
Rule of Evidence 702.80        
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. State v. Sharma  
In August 2006, Sahil Sharma, then a 25-year-old third-year law 
student from New York, traveled to Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio, for his 
cousin’s wedding.81  On the night before the wedding, Sharma and other 
members of the wedding party made their way to the bar at Sharma’s 
hotel, and one of Sharma’s cousins brought along a female friend.82  
Sharma and the woman became acquainted, and both had quite a bit to 
drink.83  The woman had asked earlier that day if there would be a place 
to rest before driving home, and Sharma’s cousin said his room would 
be fine.84  By the early morning hours, the woman asked to lie down and 
made her way to the suite Sharma was sharing with his cousin.85  What 
exactly happened next would be the subject of bitter dispute over the 
next year. 
The next morning the woman claimed she had been raped, and 
Sharma woke up to the sound of police pounding on his door.86  Sharma 
was arrested and ultimately indicted on one count of sexual battery, a 
third-degree felony.87  From the beginning he vigorously asserted his 
 
 78.  See Morgan, supra note 66, at 103.  See also id. at 103 n.81 (providing a sample of lower 
court cases ignoring the Davis interpretation of Souel).  
 79.  Id. at 103.   
 80.  See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 81.  Rebecca Meiser, Duke Comes to Akron: Is an Overzealous Prosecutor Hunting an 
Innocent Man?, CLEVELAND SCENE, June 20, 2007, http://www.newtimesjobs.com/2007-06-
20/news/duke-comes-to-akron. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id.  See also Ed Meyer, Polygraph Tests OK’d for Trial; Evidence Supports Law Student 
Charged with Sexual Battery, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, May 16, 2007, http://www.lie 
assurance.com /html/ LieAssurance_OhioCase.html. 
 84.  Meiser, supra note 81. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id.  
 87.  State v. Sharma, 875 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2007).  As noted infra, this 
citation is to Judge Judy Hunter’s pre-trial order admitting the unstipulated polygraph evidence 
15
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innocence and maintained that his sexual contact with the woman was 
consensual.88  For help, Sharma retained long-time Akron defense 
attorney Kirk Migdal.89  Sexual assault cases are notoriously difficult to 
defend, as they often involve “he said/she said” situations clouded by 
alcohol, tend to be forcefully prosecuted, and entail significant 
stigmatization.90  This case was no exception.  Nonetheless, Sharma 
remained persistent in asserting his innocence.91  
Migdal proceeded to do what he had often done with clients: he 
took Sharma to William Evans, an experienced and highly regarded 
local polygraph examiner, for a polygraph test.92  In the test, Evans 
asked Sharma specific questions about disputed facts.93  According to 
Evans, the test indicated that Sharma was not being deceptive in his 
answers.94  After he was indicted, Sharma took and “passed” two more 
polygraphs administered by two other examiners, Steven Stechschulte 
and Dr. Louis Rovner.95  Both Stechschulte and Rovner are also 
experienced and highly regarded polygraph experts.96  
Shortly after the indictment, Migdal and the prosecutor’s office 
explored the possibility of using a stipulated polygraph to help resolve 
the case, but the prosecutor’s office ultimately declined to stipulate to 
polygraph testing.97  Sharma and Migdal then filed a motion to admit the 
polygraph evidence, and Judge Judy Hunter set a hearing on the matter.98  
 
proffered by the defense.  It did not announce the final disposition in the case, which came three 
months later when Judge Hunter acquitted Sharma in a bench trial.  
 88.  See Meiser, supra note 81.   
 89.  Id.   
 90.  Id. See also Online Lawyer Source, Defending a Sexual Assault, 
http://www.onlinelawyersource.com/criminal_law/ sexual_assault.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2008) 
(noting that “[b]ecause the media and politics play such large roles in sexual assault cases, there is 
significant potential for immediate personal, social, and professional damage to the accused, even 
before trial proceedings begin.  In addition, sexual assault cases tend to be aggressively prosecuted 
and often come with harsh penalties.”).  
 91.  Meiser, supra note 81. 
 92.  Id.; See Sharma, 875 N.E.2d at 1006-07 (describing William Evans’ extensive credentials 
and 30 years’ experience with polygraphs, and noting that Evans had been used by the prosecutor’s 
office on numerous occasions for investigatory purposes and by stipulation).  Sharma’s initial 
polygraph with William Evans took place before he was indicted.  Meiser, supra note 81.      
 93.  Meiser, supra note 81. 
 94.  Id.  In common parlance, Sharma “passed.”   
 95.  Sharma, 875 N.E.2d at 1007. 
 96.  See id. (describing in detail Stechschulte’s and Rovner’s extensive credentials and 
experience, including Stechschulte’s 14 years’ experience and over 2,700 polygraph tests performed 
and Rovner’s doctorate in psychophysiology along with his 21 years’ experience).  Dr. Rovner is 
considered among the nation’s foremost polygraph experts.  Meiser, supra note 81. 
 97.  Sharma, 875 N.E.2d at 1003. 
 98.  Id.  
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At the hearing, the three experts who administered Sharma’s polygraphs 
testified.99   
On May 11, 2007, Judge Hunter issued an order that sent 
shockwaves through the legal community.  She agreed to admit 
Sharma’s unstipulated polygraph evidence, an unprecedented ruling 
outside the state of New Mexico.100  The prosecutors were not happy, 
charging that Judge Hunter disregarded Ohio law.101  In the order, Judge 
Hunter summarized her rationale as follows: 
Given the advancements in polygraph technology since 1978, this 
court finds that the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment 
warrant the admission of nonstipulated polygraph evidence in this 
limited situation in which the trial court has independently found that 
the proffered polygraph is reliable under Evid.R. 702 and only when 
the polygraphist is subject to cross-examination and where limited jury 
instructions are utilized, as required by Souel . . . . Under the unique 
circumstances of this case, where this Court has conducted an 
evidentiary hearing to evaluate the reliability of the instant polygraph 
evidence, where all three polygraphists have testified as to the general 
acceptance of polygraph use and methodology, and where all three 
testified that the defendant was not being deceptive in his answers to 
their questions pertaining to the charge of sexual battery, this Court 
finds that the polygraph evidence is admissible at trial.102  
Judge Hunter acknowledged that she was not following Ohio 
precedent by discarding Souel’s stipulation requirement and admitting 
unstipulated polygraphs.103  However, she twice used the words “unique 
circumstances” in describing the Sharma case, and she gave great weight 
to the polygraphers’ testimony regarding improvements in polygraph 
technology and accuracy.104   
 
 99.  Id.  At the hearing, four exhibits were admitted into evidence: the polygraph reports of 
Mr. Evans, Mr. Stechschulte, and Dr. Rovner, and a published research article by Dr. Rovner titled 
“The Accuracy of Physiological Detection of Deception for Subjects with Prior Knowledge.”  Id.  
The state cross-examined the polygraph examiners but did not put on any evidence of its own.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 1003, 1006, 1010.  See supra notes 27-67 and accompanying text. 
 101.  Meiser, supra note 81. 
 102.  State v. Sharma, 875 N.E.2d 1002, 1010 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2007).  
 103.  Id. (stating that “[w]ith this ruling, the court recognizes that it is not following established 
state precedent regarding the requirement that the parties stipulate concerning the admissibility of 
the polygraph tests in order to present polygraph evidence at trial.”). 
 104.  Id. at 1010-11 (stating that “based upon the unique circumstances of this case and the 
great advancements in the technology of polygraph examinations and greater consensus by the 
scientific community as to its accuracy, this court will admit the polygraph tests and testimony over 
the state’s objection to its admissibility without prior stipulation.”).  
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 Judge Hunter began her analysis by noting that the Ohio Supreme 
Court has not addressed the issue of polygraph relevancy and reliability 
since Souel in 1978 and Davis in 1991.105  Judge Hunter found this 
significant because, as previously indicated, both Souel and Davis 
predate the Supreme Court’s Daubert standard, adopted in 1993, and the 
amended version of the Ohio Rules of Evidence, which took effect in 
1994.106  After setting out Ohio Rule of Evidence 702,107 Judge Hunter 
applied each of the Rule’s three main requirements to the Sharma 
case.108  
 The prosecution did not call into question the requirements of 
Ohio Rule of Evidence 702(A) and (B), and Judge Hunter had little 
difficulty finding that those requirements were met.109  As for Rule 
702(A), Judge Hunter said that “the use of polygraph tests and the 
interpretation of the test results relate to matters beyond the knowledge 
or experience possessed by laypersons. . . .  Polygraph tests . . . are 
science-related matters beyond the knowledge of a layperson.”110  Judge 
Hunter also found all three of Sharma’s polygraph examiners to be 
“eminently qualified as experts in the field of polygraph testing based 
 
 105.  Id. at 1005. 
 106.  Id. at 1005-06.  
 107.  Evid.R. 702. Testimony by Experts 
A witness may testify as an expert if all of the following apply: 
(A) The witness' testimony either relates to matters beyond the 
knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a 
misconception common among lay persons; 
(B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the 
subject matter of the testimony; 
(C) The witness' testimony is based on reliable scientific, 
technical, or other specialized information.  To the extent that the 
testimony reports the result of a procedure, test, or experiment, the 
testimony is reliable only if all of the following apply: 
(1) The theory upon which the procedure, test, or 
experiment is based is objectively verifiable or is 
validly derived from widely accepted knowledge, facts, 
or principles; 
(2) The design of the procedure, test, or experiment 
reliably implements the theory; 
(3) The particular procedure, test, or experiment was 
conducted in a way that will yield an accurate result. 
 108.  Sharma, 875 N.E.2d at 1006-10.   
 109.  Id. at 1006-07. 
 110.  Id. at 1006. 
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upon their individual knowledge, skill, experience, training, and 
education,”111 thus fulfilling Rule 702(B)’s requirement.   
 Not surprisingly, Judge Hunter’s Rule 702(C) reliability analysis 
occupied the largest portion of her order.112  Reliability has been a 
constant point of controversy since the polygraph’s inception, and 
reliability concerns remain the major rationale for the rules banning 
polygraph evidence in the majority of states.113  Judge Hunter described 
in detail much of Dr. Rovner’s testimony, in which he invoked a number 
of studies indicating the polygraph’s reliability as a scientific testing 
method.114  At the hearing, Dr. Rovner also testified that polygraphs are 
generally accepted in the scientific community and regularly used 
throughout the United States and the world.115  Judge Hunter described 
the particular testing procedures used by each of the three examiners and 
 
 111.  Id. at 1007. 
 112.  Id. at 1007-10. 
 113.  See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
 114.  State v. Sharma, 875 N.E.2d 1002, 1007-08 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2007).  Judge Hunter’s 
description read as follows:   
Dr. Rovner testified that his doctoral thesis was on the validity of the use of the Utah 
Zone Comparison Polygraph Test to determine a participant’s truthfulness.  This two-
year controlled study was presented to the Society for Psycho-physiological Research in 
1979 and published in the Journal of Polygraph for the American Polygraph Association.  
Based upon this objective study, the overall accuracy for polygraphs was 95.5 percent 
for the standard noninformational group (no prior knowledge of polygraph testing 
procedures), 95.5 percent for the informational group (knowledge of polygraph testing 
procedures), and 71 percent for the informational practice group (knowledge of 
polygraph testing procedures and previous experience in taking polygraphs).   
 
Dr. Rovner further testified that the results of his study are consistent with subsequent 
studies on the subject.  In fact, he indicated that his testing procedures and results were 
recently replicated in a new study that is to appear in the Journal of British Psychological 
Society later this year.  
Id.   
 115.  Id. at 1008.  Judge Hunter continued:  
In mid 1980, the Gallup Organization surveyed the members from the Society for 
Psychological Research regarding the acceptance rate for polygraph tests.  The survey 
indicated an 83 percent approval rating for polygraph tests as a viable and valid 
technique.  A second survey was done in 1990 duplicating the 83 percent acceptance 
rate. 
 
Dr. Rovner also indicated that polygraphs are used on a regular basis throughout the 
United States and the world.  In fact, he indicated that in the United States, polygraphs 
are used by the Department of Defense, the FBI, CIA, NSA, DEA, and Secret Service; 
all branches of the military; and numerous state and local law-enforcement agencies in 
Ohio and throughout the country.  He estimated that the annual budget for the 
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explained why she felt those procedures were reliable.116  Judge Hunter 
noted Dr. Rovner’s remark that “even if all three polygraph tests had a 
ten percent error rate, the probability that all three examiners made the 
exact same mistake is probably one out of one thousand.”117   
 Judge Hunter attempted to dispel any concerns about Sharma’s 
possible use of countermeasures to “beat” the tests or the possibility of 
multiple tests skewing the results.  In making this argument, she again 
relied on the examiners’ testimonies that these were not concerns.118  
The effect of multiple testing is a particularly interesting question.  
Might someone with recent experience taking a polygraph and a basic 
knowledge of testing procedures be better equipped to manipulate the 
results?  Not only did this not concern Judge Hunter, but she took the 
fact that Sharma passed three polygraphs as an indicator of reliability.119  
Judge Hunter acknowledged the Davis Court’s concern that the 
polygraph is open to the examiner’s subjective interpretation.120  She 
answered that concern by noting that all three of Sharma’s examiners 
conclusively determined he was not deceptive, and that two of the 
examiners had their tests peer-reviewed specifically to alleviate any 
subjectivity concerns.121       
 
 116.  Id.  Judge Hunter explained:  
Mr. Evans and Mr. Stechschulte performed different variations of the Modified General 
Question Test (“MGQT”) on Mr. Sharma.  Dr. Rovner performed the Utah Zone of 
Comparison Test.  The MGQT and Utah Test are similar in their implementation, except 
they use a different order of questions asked of the participant.  Both tests are widely 
used in the polygraph community.  All three polygraphists used the most advanced 
computerized polygraph machines.  All three individuals independently found that Mr. 
Sharma was not being deceitful during the examination concerning questions asked.  
Both Mr. Evans and Mr. Stechschulte had their polygraph tests independently peer-
reviewed prior to issuing a final report.   
Id.   
 117.  Id. at 1008 n.2. 
 118.  Id. at 1008-09 (stating that “all three [examiners] believed that Mr. Sharma did not use 
any countermeasures to skew the test results and further, that the fact that he had more than one 
polygraph test did not have an adverse effect on the test results.  Concerning the contention that the 
defendant may have been overtested, both Mr. Evans and Dr. Rovner were of the opinion that 
multiple testing posed no legitimate concern.”).  
 119.  Id. at 1010. 
 120.  State v. Sharma, 875 N.E.2d 1002, 1010 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2007).  See State v. Davis, 
581 N.E.2d 1362, 1376 (Ohio 1991) (stating that “[t]he nature of polygraphs is different from 
traditional scientific tests.  Most, if not all, scientific tests involve objective measurements, such as 
blood or genetic typing or gunshot residue.  In a polygraph test, the bodily response of the examinee 
to his answers is dependant upon the subjective interpretation thereof by the examiner.”).        
 121.  Sharma, 875 N.E.2d at 1010. 
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 Judge Hunter then outlined a policy argument for why it was fair 
to admit Sharma’s unstipulated polygraph results.122  She reasoned that 
because the prosecutor’s office itself regularly relies upon polygraphs to 
resolve cases, the office must accept the validity and reliability of 
polygraph testing.123  In fact, the prosecutor’s office had itself used 
William Evans, Sharma’s pre-indictment examiner, on numerous 
occasions for investigatory purposes and by stipulation.124  Yet, Judge 
Hunter observed that, “perhaps for policy or strategic reasons,” in some 
cases the prosecutor’s office chooses not to utilize polygraph testing.125  
Under Souel’s stipulation rule, Judge Hunter argued that the prosecutor’s 
office has “unfettered discretion . . . to pick and choose in which case a 
polygraph will be used.”126  In contrast, defendants wishing to introduce 
exculpatory polygraphs have “limited choice” in that they are not 
permitted to present polygraph evidence without the prosecution’s 
approval.127  In light of what she perceived as reliable polygraph 
evidence before her, Judge Hunter ultimately decided that to apply a 
strict stipulation requirement would unfairly curtail Sharma’s Sixth 
Amendment right to present a defense.128     
B. Questions Arising from State v. Sharma 
Unfortunately for interested observers, Judge Hunter’s order was 
not ultimately appealed.  The prosecutor’s office attempted to file an 
interlocutory appeal immediately following the order admitting the 
 
 122.  Id. at 1009-10. 
 123.  Id. at 1009 (stating that “[t]his court notes that the Summit County Prosecutor’s Office 
routinely uses polygraphs as a means to clear defendants after indictment.  In fact, one of the top 
five reasons for the prosecutor’s office dismissing an indictment during the year 2004 was because 
the polygraph or other test result cleared the defendant . . . . Furthermore, the prosecutor’s office has 
used polygraphs as a means to resolve at least two sexual-offense cases since 2005.  Thus the 
prosecutor’s office regularly relies on the test to resolve certain cases.  In doing so, the office 
apparently accepts the validity and reliability of the polygraph test process.”). 
 124.  Id. at 1007. 
 125.  Id. at 1009. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  State v. Sharma, 875 N.E.2d 1002, 1009-10 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2007) (stating that 
“[c]urrently, under the holding in Souel, the prosecutor’s office has the right to refuse to stipulate to 
a polygraph test.  This unfettered discretion gives the prosecutor the ability to pick and choose in 
which case a polygraph will be utilized.  On the other hand, a defendant who wishes to utilize 
polygraph test results has limited choice and cannot present expert polygraph evidence in his 
defense unless the state consents.”). 
 128.  Id. at 1010 (stating that “[g]iven the quality of the polygraph examiners and the 
demonstrated reliability of the polygraph evidence, the overall advancements in polygraph testing, 
and the defendant’s right to subpoena witnesses to assist in presenting a defense, this court finds that 
the polygraph test results shall be admitted.”). 
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polygraphs, but the Ohio Ninth District Court of Appeals rejected the 
appeal as not ripe since it was a pre-trial evidentiary issue.129  During the 
bench trial three months later, the prosecution itself ironically introduced 
some of the polygraph evidence in an attempt to show that Sharma made 
some contradictory statements.130  Judge Hunter, however, was not 
swayed, and she ultimately found Sharma not guilty.131  After Sharma 
was acquitted, the prosecutor’s office did not appeal Judge Hunter’s 
admission of the unstipulated polygraph evidence.      
The Sharma case raises a number of questions about the future of 
polygraph admissibility law and particularly unstipulated polygraphs.  
Some observers felt that the admission of unstipulated polygraphs in 
Sharma ultimately achieved equity, while others were bothered by Judge 
Hunter’s lack of adherence to precedent and willingness to accept 
evidence that remains very controversial.132  Even assuming Judge 
Hunter came to a just decision in Sharma’s “unique circumstances,” how 
far should the notion of admitting unstipulated polygraphs be extended?   
That general question inevitably raises several more questions: If a 
defendant has taken and passed a private polygraph, should the 
prosecution at least have the right to retest the defendant with its own 
 
 129.  State v. Sharma, No. 23747 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 2007) (order denying interlocutory 
appeal).  The Ninth District’s rejection of the state’s appeal read:  
R.C. 2945.67 permits the state to appeal certain trial court orders in a criminal matter.  
Depending upon the order, such an appeal may be taken as a matter of right or may 
require leave of court.  Upon review of appellant’s motion, we decline to grant leave to 
appeal the May 11, 2007 order.  The May 11, 2007 order is an interlocutory, pre-trial 
evidentiary issue.  Therefore, the issue is not yet ripe for appeal and the matter is 
premature. 
  Id. 
 130.  Ed Meyer, Man Found Not Guilty in Sexual Battery Case, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, 
Aug. 21, 2007, https://antipolygraph.org/blog/?p=160 (stating that “[i]n [Judge] Hunter’s pretrial 
decision allowing the three polygraphs, she set the condition that the evidence could be used only if 
Sharma testify [sic] and, in turn, subject himself to cross-examination.  But as the prosecution’s case 
was winding down . . . , the state played a 2 ½-hour DVD of one of the polygraph tests by Dr. Louis 
Rovner of Los Angeles in an apparent attempt to show how Sharma allegedly made contradictory 
statements to investigators . . . . [A]fter the prosecution opened the door to the polygraph evidence, 
defense lawyer Kirk A. Migdal decided there was no need for Sharma to testify, so he never took 
the stand in his own defense.”).  
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Those who continue to view polygraphy as an oppressive “pseudo-science,” like those at 
Antipolygraph.org, expressed their disappointment at Judge Hunter’s decision to admit unstipulated 
polygraphs.  See AntiPolygraph.org, https://antipolygraph.org/blog/?p=146 (last visited October 9, 
2008) (noting that “[r]egardless of the merits of the case at hand, the outcomes of pseudo-scientific 
polygraph ‘tests’ should never be admitted as evidence in any court of law, or be relied upon in any 
way when it comes to the dispensing of justice.”).  This is anything but a fringe viewpoint, as it 
remains the view of a majority of states and courts throughout America.  See supra Part II(A)(3). 
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examiner as a prerequisite to admission?133  Should a defendant 
introducing unstipulated polygraph evidence always be required to 
testify in his own defense?  Further, should it matter that a defendant has 
passed more than one polygraph?  Should it matter whether the trier of 
fact will be a judge, as in Sharma, or a jury?134  Should any of this be 
applicable in the civil context?  
Perhaps the most important question is what impact, if any, Sharma 
will have on polygraph admissibility law in Ohio and nationwide.  Was 
Sharma an aberration confined to these facts and this judge, or will the 
decision ultimately be seen as pioneering significant change?  When 
change does eventually occur, what should that change look like?           
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Case against Polygraph Admissibility 
Despite unquestionable advances in polygraph technology over the 
years, there remains a very strong case against polygraph 
admissibility.135  The case against wider polygraph admissibility 
includes reliability/validity concerns, concern that polygraph evidence 
usurps the jury function, concern that polygraph evidence creates time-
consuming collateral litigation, and even concern that widespread 
polygraph admission will place an unfair burden on a criminal 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights.   
1. Reliability and Validity Concerns        
The polygraph’s lie-detection procedure is fundamentally a 
psychological test.136  As such, the scientific community evaluates 
 
 133.  Stipulation alleviates this concern because it provides a mutually agreed polygraph 
examiner that uses methods and asks questions both parties have agreed to beforehand.    
 134.  See infra notes 165-170 for the argument that polygraph evidence tends to usurp the jury 
function because juries give the evidence too much weight.  This leads to the question: Would Judge 
Hunter have admitted the polygraph evidence if the case was to be tried to a jury?  
 135.  New Mexico is the only state that generally allows admission of polygraph evidence 
without the parties’ stipulation.  See supra Part II(A)(4).  New Mexico has also adopted a unique, 
separate rule of evidence dealing solely with polygraphs and providing specific procedures and 
reliability requirements.  Id.  Several other states have a stipulation requirement, and a majority of 
states ban polygraph evidence altogether.  See supra notes 30, 71, and accompanying text.  
 136.  Benjamin Kleinmuntz & Julian J. Szucko, On the Fallibility of Lie Detection, 17 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 85, 86 (1982).  More specifically, the polygraph is “a psychometric device in the sense 
that it is a standardized instrument or systematic procedure designed to obtain a measure of a 
sample of psychological behavior.”  Id.  
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polygraph tests by the same standards required of all scientific tests, the 
most important being reliability and validity.137  “Accuracy” is the 
common term for a type of validity known as criterion validity.138 
Reliability evaluates a test’s consistency in measuring its subject 
matter.139  This consistency can be evaluated by measuring the extent of 
agreement in scores among individuals between test and retest, or by 
measuring the level of consensus attained among examiners who score 
their polygraph charts the same way.140  Validity, on the other hand, 
evaluates the extent to which a test actually measures what it claims to 
measure.141  Thus, while a test may be reliable because it produces 
similar scores when given on different occasions or by different 
examiners, these scores will not be valid if they are not actually 
associated with the behavior in question.142  Simply stated, the validity 
question with respect to polygraphs is: Does the lie-detector actually 
detect lying?   
Regarding polygraph reliability/validity, the Supreme Court 
illustrated the ongoing debate in 1998’s United States v. Scheffer,143 
where a plurality of the Court upheld the military rule of evidence 
banning all polygraph evidence in courts-martial.144  The plurality did so 
 
 137.  Id.   
 138.  COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON THE POLYGRAPH, THE NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 31 (2003), http://books.nap.edu 
/openbook.php?record_id=10420&page=R1 [hereinafter POLYGRAPH REPORT].  The other type of 
validity is known as construct validity.  Id. at 31-32.  The difference between these two terms will 
be explained infra at note 141. 
 139.  Kleinmuntz & Szucko, supra note 136, at 86. 
 140.  Id.  
 141.  Id. at 87.  There are two types of validity, “criterion validity” (or accuracy) and 
“construct validity.”  Criterion validity is an empirical concept, while construct validity is a 
theoretical concept.  POLYGRAPH REPORT, supra note 138, at 31.  Criterion validity (“accuracy”) 
refers to how well a measure, like polygraph results that purport to indicate deception/nondeception, 
match the phenomenon that the test is intended to capture, like the actual deceptiveness or 
truthfulness of the subject.  Id.  The proportion of correct judgments made by the polygraph 
examiner is a commonly used measure of “accuracy” for the polygraph test.  Id.  Construct validity, 
on the other hand, refers to how well explanatory theories and concepts account for performance of 
a test.  Id. at 32.  For example, the controversial theory behind polygraphs is that lying leads to 
psychological arousal, which in turn creates physiological arousal; the polygraph measures 
physiological responses that correspond to this arousal, like galvanic skin response, respiration, 
heart rate, and blood pressure; the polygraph’s measurements are processed, combined, and scored 
to compute an overall index, which is used to make a judgment about the subject’s truthfulness.  Id.  
The construct validity of a polygraph test depends upon validity at every step of this theoretical 
chain.  Id.    
 142.  POLYGRAPH REPORT, supra note 138, at 32.  
 143.  523 U.S. 303 (1998).  For a more complete discussion of this important case, see supra 
notes 35-39 and accompanying text.    
 144.  Id. at 303, 312, 317.  Military Rule of Evidence 707(a) provides:  
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over the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense 
argument largely because of its concern that “there is simply no 
consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable.”145  The Court added: “To 
this day, the scientific community remains extremely polarized about the 
reliability of polygraph techniques.”146  In addition, the Court pointed 
out that even if polygraph technology was ultimately agreed to be 
reliable, questions would remain about the possible use of 
countermeasures to “fool” or “beat” the test.147  The Court concluded 
that Military Rule of Evidence 707 is a “rational and proportionate” way 
of protecting against unreliable evidence, and suggested that individual 
jurisdictions might reasonably differ on the question of polygraph 
reliability and admissibility.148   
 
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the 
opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or 
taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence.”   
 145.  Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309. 
 146.  Id.  The Court substantiated this statement with the following: 
Some studies have concluded that polygraph tests overall are accurate and reliable.  See, 
e.g., S. ABRAMS, THE COMPLETE POLYGRAPH HANDBOOK 190-191 (1989) (reporting the 
overall accuracy rate from laboratory studies involving the common “control question 
technique” polygraph to be “in the range of 87 percent”).  Others have found that 
polygraph tests assess truthfulness significantly less accurately - that scientific field 
studies suggest the accuracy rate of the “control question technique” polygraph is “little 
better than could be obtained by the toss of a coin,” that is, 50 percent.  See Iacono & 
Lykken, “The Scientific Status of Research on Polygraph Techniques: The Case Against 
Polygraph Tests,” in 1 Modern Scientific Evidence, § 14-5.3, at 629.   
Id. at 310. 
 147.  Id. at 310 n.6 (stating that “[e]ven if the basic debate about the reliability of polygraph 
technology itself were resolved, however, there would still be controversy over the efficacy of 
countermeasures, or deliberately adopted strategies that a polygraph examinee can employ to 
provoke physiological responses that will obscure accurate readings and thus ‘fool’ the polygraph 
machine and the examiner.”); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 319 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 
1999) (noting that “there are numerous countermeasures that a suspect can use to mislead the 
[polygraph examiner], some of which are said to be effective and difficult to detect.  It is feared that 
if the polygraph came into widespread use in court cases, these could cause the rate of false 
negatives – saying that the suspect is telling the truth when he is lying – to become intolerably 
high.”).   
 148.  Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 312 (stating that “[t]he approach taken by the President in adopting 
Rule 707 - excluding polygraph evidence in all military trials - is a rational and proportional means 
of advancing the legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence.  Although the degree of 
reliability of polygraph evidence may depend upon a variety of identifiable factors, there is simply 
no way to know in a particular case whether a polygraph examiner's conclusion is accurate, because 
certain doubts and uncertainties plague even the best polygraph exams.  Individual jurisdictions 
therefore may reasonably reach differing conclusions as to whether polygraph evidence should be 
admitted.  We cannot say, then, that presented with such widespread uncertainty, the President acted 
arbitrarily or disproportionately in promulgating a per se rule excluding all polygraph evidence.”).   
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Validity is the more serious issue for polygraphs because those 
concerns strike at the fundamental assumptions forming the foundation 
of polygraph theory.  Critics of polygraph validity argue that there is no 
reason to believe lying produces distinctive physiological changes 
characterizing it exclusively.149  They argue that, at best, the polygraph 
registers physiological indicators of anxiety, which is not the same as 
consciousness of guilt or lying.150  Kleinmuntz and Szucko illustrate the 
point: 
No doubt when we tell a lie many of us experience an inner turmoil, 
but we experience a similar turmoil when we are falsely accused of a 
crime, when we are anxious about having to defend ourselves against 
accusations, when we are questioned about sensitive topics – and, for 
that matter, when we are elated or otherwise emotionally stirred.151                
In 2003, the National Academy of Sciences released its landmark 
report, The Polygraph and Lie Detection, which focused largely on the 
question of polygraph validity.152  The report raised serious doubts about 
both the criterion and construct validity of polygraph testing.153  The 
report also criticized research progress in the field of polygraphy and 
 
 149.  Kleinmuntz & Szucko, supra note 136, at 87. 
 150.  MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 147, at 319. 
 151.  Kleinmuntz & Szucko, supra note 136, at 87.   
 152.  POLYGRAPH REPORT, supra note 138, at 2 (noting that “[t]he committee’s charge was 
specifically ‘to conduct a scientific review of the research on polygraph examinations that pertains 
to their validity and reliability . . . .’  We have focused mainly on validity because a test that is 
reliable (i.e., produces consistent outcomes) has little use unless it is also valid (i.e., measures what 
it is supposed to measure).”). 
 153.  Id. at 32, 212-14.  The Academy summarized some of its findings on polygraph validity 
as follows: 
Polygraph Accuracy:  Almost a century of research in scientific psychology and 
physiology provides little basis for the expectation that a polygraph test could have 
extremely high accuracy.  The physiological responses measured by the polygraph are 
not uniquely related to deception.  That is, the responses measured by the polygraph do 
not all reflect a single underlying process: a variety of psychological and physiological 
processes, including some that can be consciously controlled, can affect polygraph 
measures and test results.  Moreover, most polygraph testing procedures allow for 
uncontrolled variation in test administration (e.g., creation of the emotional climate, 
selecting questions) that can be expected to result in variations in accuracy and that limit 
the level of accuracy that can be consistently achieved. 
Theoretical Basis:  The theoretical rationale for the polygraph is quite weak, especially 
in terms of differential fear, arousal, or other emotional states that are triggered in 
response to relevant or comparison questions.  We have not found any serious effort at 
construct validation of polygraph testing. 
Id. at 212-213. 
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expressed a bleak view of the polygraph’s potential for greater accuracy 
in the future.154 
a. Subjectivity and Multiple Variable Concerns  
In State v. Souel,155 the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged that 
“the single most important variable affecting the accuracy of polygraph 
test results [is] the polygraph examiner.”156  Even polygraph proponents 
agree that the examiner, not the machine, is the most crucial factor in 
achieving reliable results.157  Critics have consistently charged that 
polygraph testing procedures require the examiner to inject a high degree 
of subjectivity into the examination.158  A number of organizations, 
including the American Polygraph Association (APA) and the American 
Association of Police Polygraphists, conduct specialized and annual 
courses, but these organizations cannot compel attendance.159  Most 
states require polygraph examiners to be licensed, but no uniform 
training standards or testing procedures exist.160  The polygraph 
 
 154.  Id. at 213.  Regarding polygraph  research progress and future potential, the Academy 
made the following conclusions: 
Research Progress:  Research on the polygraph has not progressed over time in the 
manner of a typical scientific field.  It has not accumulated knowledge or strengthened 
its scientific underpinnings in any significant manner.  Polygraph research has proceeded 
in relative isolation from related fields of basic science and has benefited little from 
conceptual, theoretical, and technological advances in those fields that are relevant to the 
psycho-physiological detection of deception. 
Future Potential:  The inherent ambiguity of the physiological measures used in the 
polygraph suggest that further investments in improving polygraph technique and 
interpretation will bring only modest improvements in accuracy. 
Id. 
 155.  372 N.E.2d 1318 (Ohio 1978). 
 156.  Id. at 1323. 
 157.  See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 40, at 419-20.  Giannelli and Imwinkelried 
note that: 
The examiner’s expertise is critical in (1) determining the suitability of the subject for 
testing, (2) formulating proper test questions, (3) establishing the necessary rapport with 
the subject, (4) detecting attempts to mask or create chart reactions or other 
countermeasures, (5) stimulating the subject to react, and (6) interpreting the charts.   
Id.  
 158.  See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, United States v. Scheffer, No. 96-1133 (U.S. July 3, 
1997), 1997 WL 367053, at *23;  see also State v. Davis, 581 N.E.2d 1362, 1376 (Ohio 1991). 
 159.  See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 40, at 421.  The American Polygraph 
Association (APA) was founded in 1966.  See American Polygraph Association, 
http://www.polygraph.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).  The APA has accredited fourteen polygraph 
schools.  GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 40, at 420 n.22.  One school is in Canada 
(Canadian Police College Polygraph School).  Id.  The rest are located in the United States, 
including two government-sponsored schools: DoD Polygraph Institute and the Texas Department 
of Public Safety Law Enforcement Polygraph School.  Id.     
 160.  GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 40, at 420-21 (stating that “[o]ver half the 
states have licensing statutes, a number of which require continuing education (typically 20 hours 
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examiner’s expertise is vital to any polygraph test, and critics claim that 
a substantial number of examiners lack adequate training and 
competence.161  
Another concern along these lines is that the polygraph test is not 
replicable because it only tests a person’s physiological reactions to 
questions posed at a particular time and place.162  The fear is that a 
person may produce a completely different polygraph chart in response 
to the same questions asked on a different day or in a different setting.163  
Courts have pointed to multiple variables that may influence the results 
of a particular polygraph test, including the physical and mental 
condition of the subject, the subject’s attitude toward the examiner, the 
subject’s use of alcohol or drugs, distractions in the examination setting, 
the extent of a guilty subject’s subjective belief in his own innocence, 
and the phrasing of the examiner’s questions.164          
 
per year) . . . . In some jurisdictions, the statute merely establishes an administrative agency, which 
is responsible for promulgating rules governing examiners.”).  See also Brief for the State of 
Connecticut et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 
(1998) (No. 96-1133), 1997 WL 370039, at *12 (arguing that, while polygraph examiners are 
required in many states to obtain a license, there are no uniform standards for training examiners 
and no uniform test procedures).    
 161.  See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 164 n.6 (8th Cir. 1975) (stating that 
“[e]xperts in neurology, psychiatry and physiology may offer needed enlightenment upon the basic 
premises of polygraphy.  Polygraphists often lack extensive training in these specialized sciences.”); 
see also David C. Raskin, The Polygraph in 1986: Professional and Legal Issues Surrounding 
Application and Acceptance of Polygraph Evidence, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 29, 66-67 (1986) (noting 
that “[p]erhaps the major problem with polygraph evidence and testimony is the present state of 
training and competence of polygraph examiners . . . . [A] substantial proportion of those who 
conduct tests in the public and private sectors lack adequate training and competence.”).  
 162.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 158, at *23 (stating that “[c]ourts have noted the highly 
subjective nature of polygraph testing.  Because a polygraph examination tests a person’s 
physiological reactions to questions posed at a particular time and place, the test is not replicable.  
Influences as varied as the emotional state of the subject on the day of the test, the room in which 
the polygraph is administered, the amount of sleep the subject has had the night before, and the 
number of cups of coffee the subject has consumed before the test may alter the physiological 
responses to questions.”).   
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. at *23 n.8.  See also Alexander, 526 F.2d at 165 (stating that “[a]mong the numerous 
constituents which may individually or collectively operate to result in an inaccurate [polygraph] 
reading are: (1) the physiological abnormalities of the examinee, which may include high or low 
blood pressure, respiratory disorders and heart diseases, as well as a state of discomfort or extreme 
fatigue during the examination; (2) extreme nervousness or emotional tension by an innocent person 
who may believe that the polygraph will produce an inaccurate and inculpatory result; (3) anger or 
resentment toward the examiner or the questions asked; (4) inadequate or misleading phrasing of the 
questions by the examiner; and (5) a mental abnormality of the examinee, which may include 
psychosis, psychoneurosis or a psychopathic personality . . . . If the existence of these many 
variables is not detected and controlled, inaccurate or inconclusive results may be reached.”).    
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2. The Danger of Polygraph Evidence Usurping the Jury Function 
The Supreme Court has long held that determining the weight and 
credibility of witness testimony is the “part of every case [that] belongs 
to the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural 
intelligence and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of 
men.”165  The plurality in Scheffer forcefully argued that the Rule 707 
ban on polygraph evidence also served to preserve the jury’s core 
function of making credibility determinations.166  Writing for the 
plurality, Justice Thomas noted that “[a] fundamental premise of our 
criminal trial system is that ‘the jury is the lie detector.’”167  Justice 
Thomas distinguished polygraph experts from other expert witnesses and 
explained why juries are naturally inclined to give polygraph evidence 
too much weight: 
Unlike other expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside 
the jurors’ knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or 
DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury 
only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the 
witness was telling the truth.  Jurisdictions, in promulgating rules of 
evidence, may legitimately be concerned about the risk that juries will 
give excessive weight to the opinions of a polygrapher, clothed as they 
are in scientific expertise and at times offering . . . a conclusion about 
the ultimate issue in the trial.  Such jurisdictions may legitimately 
determine that the aura of infallibility attending polygraph evidence 
can lead jurors to abandon their duty to assess credibility and guilt.168     
Particularly in light of the questions surrounding polygraph 
validity, it is reasonable to believe that juries will tend to regard 
polygraph results as more scientific than they are, and, as a consequence, 
afford them too much weight.169  It also seems unlikely that a judge 
reading the jury a limiting instruction like the one adopted in Souel will 
realistically do much to curb this problem; in fact, certain limiting 
instructions may do more harm than good.170 
 
 165.  Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891). 
 166.  United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-14 (1998). 
 167.  Id. at 313 (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
 168.  Id. at 313-14. 
 169.  See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 147, at 320. 
 170.  The limiting instruction suggested by Souel and Valdez regarding stipulated polygraph 
evidence read as follows:  
(4) [I]f such evidence is admitted the trial judge should instruct the jury that the 
examiner’s testimony does not tend to prove or disprove any element of the crime with 
which a defendant is charged but at most tends only to indicate that at the time of the 
examination defendant was not telling the truth.  Further, the jury members should be 
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3. The Interest in Avoiding Collateral Litigation and Undue Delay 
Because polygraphs remain so controversial, critics argue that 
attempts to admit polygraph results inevitably produce lengthy collateral 
litigation regarding the general validity of the polygraph and the 
reliability of specific results.171  In Scheffer, the Supreme Court plurality 
cited concerns about collateral litigation as another reason for upholding 
the military’s polygraph ban: “A third legitimate interest served by Rule 
707 is avoiding litigation over issues other than the guilt or innocence of 
the accused.  Such collateral litigation prolongs criminal trials and 
threatens to distract the jury from its central function of determining 
guilt or innocence.”172   
In fact, protracted battles between experts over polygraph tests have 
occurred even in jurisdictions with extensive experience litigating 
polygraph admissibility.173  A frustrated Supreme Court of North 
 
instructed that it is for them to determine what corroborative weight and effect such 
testimony should be given.  
State v. Souel, 372 N.E.2d 1318, 1323 (Ohio 1978). 
The author suggests that a limiting instruction with this “not telling the truth” language would in 
reality cause the jury to give the polygraph testimony more weight than it would otherwise.  This is 
because it involves the judge telling the jury that the polygraph evidence tends to indicate the 
defendant was lying, likely giving the results an additional air of legitimacy in jurors’ minds.  A 
better version of this limiting instruction, without the “not telling the truth” language,  is found at 
Souel’s syllabus: 
(4) If such evidence is admitted the trial judge should instruct the jury to the effect that 
the examiner’s testimony does not tend to prove or disprove any element of the crime 
with which a defendant is charged, and that it is for the jurors to determine what weight 
and effect such testimony should be given.   
Id. at 1319.     
 171.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 158, at *29 (stating that “[b]ecause of the many elements 
of subjectivity associated with polygraphy and the lack of widespread acceptance of it in the 
scientific community, attempts to admit results of a polygraph examination will produce lengthy 
collateral litigation regarding the validity of the technique in general and the reliability of the test 
results in particular cases.”).   
 172.  Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 314.  The plurality continued:  
Allowing proffers of polygraph evidence would inevitably entail assessments of such 
issues as whether the test and control questions were appropriate, whether a particular 
polygraph examiner was qualified and had properly interpreted the physiological 
responses, and whether other factors such as countermeasures employed by the examinee 
had distorted the exam results.  Such assessments would be required in each and every 
case. 
Id. 
 173.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d 35, 36-37 (Mass. 1989) (noting the 
evidentiary hearing on admissibility of polygraph results and motion for new examinations took 
four days of court time even though polygraph evidence had been permitted in Massachusetts courts 
for fifteen years).  Citing reliability concerns, in Mendes the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts struck down its previous rule allowing polygraph evidence and reinstituted the per se 
inadmissibility of polygraph evidence in Massachusetts.  Id. at 38-41.  The previous rule was set out 
fifteen years earlier by the Court as follows: 
 [I]f a defendant agrees in advance to the admission of the results of a polygraph test 
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Carolina concluded that “the administration of justice simply cannot, and 
should not, tolerate the incredible burdens involved in the process of 
ensuring that a polygraph examination has been properly 
administered.”174  
4. Routine Polygraph Admission May Pressure Criminal 
Defendants to Forfeit Their Right against Self-Incrimination 
There is also an interesting argument against wider polygraph 
admissibility from the criminal defense perspective.  The concern here is 
that if a jurisdiction liberally admits polygraph evidence, the factfinder 
might presume that a criminal defendant who did not introduce 
polygraph evidence either failed or refused to take a test.175  Particularly 
given the fact that the polygraph’s accuracy is disputed, this type of 
reasoning by juries might amount to an unfair burden on the criminal 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.176    
 
regardless of their outcome, the trial judge, after a close and searching inquiry into the 
qualifications of the examiner, the fitness of the defendant for such examination, and the 
methods utilized in conducting the tests, may, in the proper exercise of his discretion, 
admit the results, not as binding or conclusive evidence, but to be considered with all 
other evidence as to innocence or guilt.  As a prerequisite the judge would first make 
sure that the defendant’s constitutional rights are fully protected. 
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120, 124 (Mass. 1974). 
 174.  State v. Grier, 300 S.E.2d 351, 359 (N.C. 1983).  The court continued:  
If a trial court were to adequately police the reliability of [polygraph] results, the time 
required to explore the innumerable factors which could affect the accuracy of a 
particular test would be incalculable.  
. . . [T]he criminal proceeding may degenerate into a trial of the polygraph machine . . . . 
The introduction and rebuttal of polygraph evidence . . . could divert the jury’s attention 
from the question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence to a judgment of the validity and 
limitations of the polygraph.  
Id. at 359-60. 
 175.  RICHARD O. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 
328 (2d ed. 1983).  The rule that existed in Massachusetts from 1974 to 1989 is a good example of a 
liberal polygraph admissibility rule that may raise this type of concern.  See supra note 173.  It is 
certainly conceivable that a rule like this might compel criminal defendants to forfeit their right 
against self-incrimination and submit to polygraphs on a regular basis in order to avoid the 
appearance of guilt.   
 176.  Id. (stating that “If juries knew that polygraph evidence [was] always admissible, they 
might draw a negative inference when such testimony was not offered, thus putting an additional 
price on the accused’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.”).  See also 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 147, at 320.  The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
provides, in relevant part: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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B. The Case for Further Polygraph Admissibility 
1. Stipulation Rules that Allow the Prosecutor to Decide When 
Polygraph Evidence Will Be Used May Violate an Accused’s 
Sixth Amendment Right to Present a Defense 
The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides 
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . 
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .”177  
This means that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to obtain 
and present evidence helpful to their defense.178  In criminal cases, the 
fact-finder’s decision almost always hinges on the credibility of the 
defendant and his witnesses.179  Thus, it is not surprising that many 
criminal defendants have argued that the Compulsory Process Clause 
entitles them to present to the fact-finder evidence that they passed a 
polygraph test.180   
On several occasions the Supreme Court has struck down laws 
preventing the admission of exculpatory evidence.181  In Washington v. 
Texas,182 the Supreme Court struck down two Texas statutes governing 
the competency of co-defendants to testify because the statutes 
prevented an accused from introducing potentially exculpatory 
evidence.183  The statutes invalidated in Washington provided that 
 
 177.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 178.  See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987) (stating that “[o]ur cases 
establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants have the right to the government's assistance in 
compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before a jury evidence 
that might influence the determination of guilt.”). 
 179.  See Thomas K. Downs, Admission of Polygraph Results: A Due Process Perspective, 55 
IND. L.J. 157, 180 (1979) (noting that “credibility is always at issue where witnesses testify before 
the court.  The defendant’s credibility is often critical to the defense and may be directly supported 
by relevant, reliable polygraph results.”).   
 180.  See, e.g., supra Part III(A) and notes 35-39 and accompanying text.  The defendants in 
Sharma and Scheffer both argued that the Sixth Amendment supported admission of their 
potentially exculpatory polygraph evidence.  Sharma’s argument was successful; Scheffer’s was 
not.   
 181.  Peeples, Bell & Guiffre, supra note 27, at 88. 
 182.  388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
 183.  Id. at 23 (holding that “the petitioner in this case was denied his right to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State arbitrarily denied him the right to put 
on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had 
personally observed, and whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense.”).  
Jackie Washington, on trial for murder, wanted to present the testimony of Charles Fuller, a man 
who had already been convicted and sentenced for the same murder Washington was charged with.  
Id. at 16.  The trial record indicated that, if permitted, Fuller would have testified that Washington 
pulled at him and tried to persuade him to leave, and that Washington ran before Fuller fired the 
fatal shot.  Id. 
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“persons charged or convicted as co-participants in the same crime could 
not testify for one another, although [they could testify] for the State.”184  
In Chambers v. Mississippi,185 the Supreme Court held that a Mississippi 
rule of evidence known as the “voucher” rule compromised the right of a 
defendant to call witnesses on his behalf.186  In Rock v. Arkansas,187 the 
Supreme Court applied Washington and Chambers to strike down a per 
se exclusion of hypnotically refreshed recollection.188  The Court held 
that “[a] State’s legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does 
not extend to per se exclusions that may be reliable in an individual 
case.”189 
Washington, Chambers, and Rock establish that, under certain 
circumstances, denying a criminal defendant the right to present 
exculpatory evidence may violate his constitutional right to present a 
defense.190  There is no bright-line test, and the question must 
necessarily be resolved based on the facts of each case.  A case-by-case 
analysis of Compulsory Process claims involving polygraph evidence is 
consistent with the view of scientific evidence developed in Daubert.191  
In Scheffer, the Supreme Court plurality concluded that reliability and 
public policy concerns about the polygraph outweighed the defendant’s 
 
 184.  Id. at 16-17.  Washington is most famous for its holding that the Compulsory Process 
Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it is 
“a fundamental element of due process.”  Id. at 19.  The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in 
relevant part, “[n]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.    
 185.  410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
 186.  Id. at 284, 302-03.  A Mississippi jury convicted Leon Chambers of murdering a 
policeman.  Id. at 285.  After Chambers’ arrest, a man named Gable McDonald made repeated 
confessions to the policeman’s murder, which he later recanted.  Id. at 284, 287-88.  Chambers’ 
main defense at trial was that McDonald actually committed the murder.  Id. at 289.  Because the 
prosecution did not call McDonald as a witness, Chambers had no choice but to call McDonald to 
the stand as a defense witness.  Id. at 291.  The Mississippi “voucher” rule did not permit a party to 
cross-examine his own witness unless the witness was shown to be “adverse.”  Id.  As a result, 
Chambers was unable to either cross-examine McDonald or to present witnesses who would have 
discredited McDonald.  Id. at 294. 
 187.  483 U.S. 44 (1987).   
 188.  Id. at 53-56, 62 (noting that “Arkansas’ per se rule excluding all post-hypnosis testimony 
infringes impermissibly on the right of a defendant to testify on his own behalf.”).    
 189.  Id. at 61.  
 190.  See Peeples, Bell & Guiffre, supra note 27, at 93. 
 191.  See supra Part II(A)(2).  New and novel scientific techniques clearly have a better chance 
of being admitted into evidence under Daubert than they did under Frye.  If a new technique is 
found to be reliably scientific, the fact that it has not yet been “generally accepted” is no longer 
fatal.  Under Daubert, the trial judge’s job in dealing with scientific evidence is quite different than 
it was under Frye.  It is no longer enough for the judge to conduct a “head count” and allow 
scientific evidence only if enough experts in the field have accepted it.  Instead, the judge must 
make her own case-by-case assessment of the reliability of the science, with general acceptance 
only one factor to consider.       
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Compulsory Process concerns.192  In Sharma, on the other hand, Judge 
Hunter concluded that Compulsory Process concerns outweighed 
reliability and other concerns about the polygraph.193     
V. CONCLUSION 
Ohio could improve its approach to polygraph admissibility by 
removing stipulation as an absolute requirement, as this requirement is 
inconsistent with Daubert’s spirit of trial judge discretion in dealing 
with novel scientific evidence.194  However, given the strong arguments 
for restricting polygraph admissibility,195 Ohio law should stop well 
short of encouraging the routine admission of polygraph evidence.   
Rather than being an absolute requirement for polygraph admission, 
stipulation should be the standard guideline that Ohio judges follow in 
all but the most exceptional cases.  If the State and defendant have 
entered into a stipulation agreement, courts should not simply presume 
that the polygraph evidence is reliable enough to qualify as relevant 
scientific evidence.  If a test is found to be unreliable, a stipulation 
should not be honored and the polygraph evidence should not be 
admitted.  On the other hand, in exceptional cases, judges should not be 
forced to bar defendants’ polygraph evidence that they find to be 
otherwise relevant and reliable solely because the parties did not 
stipulate beforehand.  In this scenario, however, the prosecution should 
have the right to retest the defendant with its own examiner and test 
questions, with the results to be admitted alongside the defendant’s 
private polygraph results (provided they are also determined to be 
reliable).  Souel’s three other safeguards outside of stipulation should be 
retained in full.196    
 
 192.  United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 316-17 (1998). 
 193.  State v. Sharma, 875 N.E.2d 1002, 1010-11 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2007). 
 194.  See supra Part II(A)(2) and note 191. 
 195.  See supra Parts IV(A)(1), (2), (3), and (4). 
 196.  To review, those other safeguards are: 
 
(2) Notwithstanding the stipulation, the admissibility of the test results is 
subject to the discretion of the trial judge, and if the trial judge is not 
convinced that the examiner is qualified or that the test was conducted under 
proper conditions he may refuse to accept such evidence.   
 
(3) If the graphs and examiner’s opinion are offered in evidence the opposing 
party shall have the right to cross-examine the examiner respecting: 
(a) the examiner’s qualifications and training; 
            (b) the conditions under which the test was administered; 
(c) the limitations of and possibilities for error in the technique of 
polygraphic interrogation; and,  
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As a general principle, polygraph experts should not be treated the 
same as any other expert, as the Ohio Supreme Court suggested in 
Souel.197  The Souel court could not truly have believed the statement it 
quoted about treating polygraph experts the same as other experts, or it 
would not have created a stipulation requirement that in fact treats 
polygraph experts differently than other experts.  The nature of a 
polygraph expert’s testimony is fundamentally different from other 
scientific testimony.198  The polygraph expert is presented as possessing 
scientific proof of a witness’s veracity, making him a sort of expert 
character and credibility witness.199  Polygraph evidence is consumptive 
of time, it may be given undue weight by jurors, and its 
reliability/validity remains a serious and controversial issue.200  Judges 
should take into account whether the trier of fact will be the judge 
herself or a jury, and polygraph evidence should be admitted less often 
where cases are being tried to a jury.     
Because polygraph evidence differs significantly from other forms 
of scientific evidence,201 Ohio and other states might benefit from a new 
and separate Rule of Evidence pertaining exclusively to polygraphs and 
constructing uniform standards for their admissibility.  This rule might 
be similar to New Mexico Rule of Evidence 11-707, setting out 
particular and standardized requirements for how a “reliable” polygraph 
test is to be conducted.202  A study of New Mexico Rule 707 and its 
successes and failures is beyond the scope of this Note, but this sort of 
information could aid in crafting a more effective rule.  Highly regarded 
polygraphers should be consulted for suggestions.  The new rule would 
work in concert with Ohio Rule of Evidence 702203 and Daubert’s more 
general reliability requirements.204  Like the New Mexico Rule, the rule 
 
(d) at the discretion of the trial judge, any other matter deemed 
pertinent to the inquiry. 
 
(4) If such evidence is admitted the trial judge should instruct the jury to the 
effect that the examiner’s testimony does not tend to prove or disprove any 
element of the crime with which a defendant is charged, and that it is for the 
jurors to determine what weight and effect such testimony should be given. 
 
State v. Souel, 372 N.E.2d 1318, 1318-19 (Ohio 1978). 
 197.  Id. at 1324 (stating, “[w]e see no reason why the polygraph expert should be treated in 
any more restrictive manner than other experts.”).   
 198.  See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 199.  Id.  
 200.  See supra Parts IV(A)(1), (2), and (3). 
 201.  See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 202.  See supra note 48. 
 203.  See supra note 29. 
 204.  See supra Part II(A)(2). 
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should apply to the admission of polygraph evidence tending to show the 
truthfulness of witnesses.  Thus, for a criminal defendant to introduce his 
own exculpatory polygraph results, he would have to take the stand in 
his own defense and subject himself to cross-examination.  
As for polygraph technology, there have been enormous advances 
since Dr. Marsten introduced his primitive “lie-detector” device in the 
early twentieth century.205  Originally, polygraph machines crudely 
recorded only systolic blood pressure.206  As the technology evolved 
over the decades, measurement of breathing was added, computerized 
scoring was adopted, and most recently voice-stress analysis has been 
added to the list of measured variables.207  The constant advancement of 
polygraph technology should be taken into account in the admissibility 
analysis.  Regardless, however, of the technology and its ability to 
provide reliable results, questions will always remain about the 
polygraph’s validity and true ability to detect lying.208  These concerns 
must be taken seriously.   
In conclusion, Ohio could improve its approach to polygraph 
admissibility by removing stipulation as an absolute requirement but 
retaining it as the basic standard for trial judges to follow.  Polygraph 
experts should not be treated the same as any other expert, and Ohio 
should adopt a new, separate rule of evidence dealing exclusively with 
polygraphs and the unique challenges that they present.  
 
 205.  Morgan, supra note 66, at 116. 
 206.  Barland, supra note 13, at 75. 
 207.  Morgan, supra note 66, at 116. 
 208.  See supra Part IV(A)(1) 
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